Past research in the area of public health communication has primarily focused on evaluating the extent to which individual exposure to deliberate communication campaigns is effective in promoting health behavior change
attention to health issues on related health behaviors. The few studies that sought to evaluate the effects of the general news coverage (e.g., Gonzenbach, 1996; Rogers, Dearing, & Chang, 1991) focused on the relationship between the media, the public, and the policy agendas without considering the effects of these interactions on actual behavior. The current study aims to fill this void by evaluating the effects of nondeliberate health information in the mass media on health behavior.
What needs to be conceptualized is the way by which media attention to public problems influences individual behavior. Past research on framing effects (Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991) has raised the possibility that exposure to news may influence individual judgments of the risk associated with performing a certain behavior (Combs & Slovic, 1979; Fischhoff, 1995; Johnson & Covello, 1987; Rothman & Salovey, 1997) . Perceptions of risk, in turn, are said to influence individual behavior (Slovic, 1987) . Studies have shown, however, that news frames may influence societal-level (or firstorder) judgments of risk but have little influence on personal judgments of risk (Culberston & Stempel, 1985; Tyler & Cook, 1984) . Moreover, Snyder and Rouse (1995) found that exposure to entertainment programs (e.g., movies and sitcoms) was more likely to be related to an increased notion of personal risk than exposure to news programs. Finally, only anecdotal evidence links personal risk perceptions to actual behavior change (Janz & Becker, 1984; Montgomery et al., 1989) . Hence, other paths of indirect media effects on behavior should be considered.
A second approach to the distinction between direct and indirect media effects offers such a path. This approach considers the extent to which media effects on behavior are mediated by other social agents (Hornik, 1997; Wright, 1986) .
2 Underlying this approach is the recognition that formal and informal social institutions such as family and peers, educational institutions, and the criminal justice system are capable of influencing the social and cultural context within which behavior decisions are made. From this perspective, a person is less likely to perform a behavior that is surrounded by an unfavorable social climate to avoid some sort of formal sanctions (i.e., breaking the law), informal sanctions (social labeling or stigma), or both. By the same token, individuals are more likely to adopt a behavior that is socially acceptable and involves considerable individual and social gains. The mass media are assumed to influence the operation of social institutions through their social functions. Among other things, the media are the main source of information and knowledge in society (Rogers, 1996) , an important agent of social control (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) and socialization (Wright, 1986) , a cultural signifier (Gerbner et al., 1986) , a public opinion leader (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Lippman, 1922) , and a champion of social problems and social wrongdoings (Protess et al., 1991) . These functions put the mass media in a central position to prompt social and cultural change that, in turn, may lead to individual behavior change.
In theory, institutional response prompted by changes in media attention to public issues may constitute any formal or informal action taken by social institutions (e.g., parents discouraging youth from adopting risky behaviors, laws aimed at curbing involvement in deviant behaviors, etc.). Yet, policy actions are often taken to represent institutional response to public problems on the media agenda (Gonzenbach, 1996; Rogers et al., 1991; Trumbo, 1995) . In this respect, there is considerable evidence that media attention to public problems influences the nature and magnitude of policy responses to these issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Gonzenbach, 1996; MacKuen, 1981; Rogers et al., 1991; Trumbo, 1995) . Moreover, as research on the agenda-setting effect of the mass media evolved, the mechanisms by which media attention to public issues influences policy behavior became increasingly clear. In addition to their indirect influence on policy agenda through the public agenda, the mass media were often found to influence policy makers directly, as policy makers often infer the public agenda from the media agenda (Linsky, 1986) . This tendency makes policy makers particularly susceptible to media coverage of public problems for two main reasons. The first is associated with the fact that both the media and the public expect policy makers to focus on resolving public problems (Dearing & Rogers, 1996) . Thus, unresponsiveness of policy makers to public problems that climb the media agenda may compromise policy makers' current position in government (Lemert, 1981) . A second, and perhaps more common reason, is that media attention to public problems opens a window of opportunity for political gain (Diani, 1996; Kingdon, 1984) . For example, favorable media coverage may increase the ability of policy makers to get their policies successfully adopted and implemented (Linsky, 1986) or win them some important political gains with key constituencies (Diani, 1996) .
Policy response to public problems posed by individual risky behaviors may be of several types. Policy makers may take a direct action against the problem (e.g., a new law or an executive order). They may also decide to allocate resources (i.e., an appropriation) for the study of the problem, the development of potential intervention programs, and the support of organizations and groups with intentions to fight the problem. What remains unclear is the extent to which policy response that was prompted by media coverage of a certain public problem actually leads to changes in the underlying behavior. Seldom have mass communication scholars studied this question. The few studies that attempted to investigate that link (e.g., Gellert, Weismuller, Higgins, & Maxwell, 1992) considered subsequent changes in real-world indicators (i.e., outcomes of a behavior) rather than changes in the behavior itself. On the other hand, there is a substantial body of research that found policy actions to be effective in changing (i.e., preventing or encouraging) behaviors such as seat belt use (Lund, Pollner, & Williams, 1987) , drunk driving (Blomberg, 1992; Hingson, 1992; Stewart & Voas, 1994) , and mammogram use by women (Weinick & Beauregard, 1997) , to name a few. Hence, an important goal of the current study is to empirically examine the plausibility of the media-policy-behavior link.
The Case of Drunk Driving Behavior
The case of drunk driving (DD) behavior is appropriate for testing the validity of the argument about indirect paths of media effects on behavior for several reasons. For one, DD is a lifestyle behavior that is associated with considerable negative individual and social outcomes, yet is performed by many people. In addition, many efforts to regulate this behavior through persuasive information (DeJong & Hingson, 1998) were generally unsuccessful, and in recent years, an increasing number of researchers have recognized that the social acceptability of this behavior is a major obstacle facing such intervention efforts (Beck & Treiman, 1996; Brown, 1998; DeJong & Hingson, 1998; Hernandez, Newcomb, & Rabow, 1995; Powell & Drucker, 1997; Stewart & Voas, 1994; Williams, 1994) . This recognition implies that some type of social action is needed to reduce the incidence of this behavior. Finally, although no direct intervention in this behavior can claim significant effect on reducing DD incidence in the long run (Williams, 1994) , the incidence of DD behavior substantially decreased over the past two decades (Lane, Stinson, & Bertolucci, 1997; Stewart & Voas, 1994) . Both the characteristics of DD behavior and the decrease in its prevalence in recent years are similar to those observed regarding other harmful behaviors such as cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse, and consumption of high-fat foods. These similarities seem to increase the generalizability of the current study's findings to other risky health behaviors.
Of particular interest for the purpose of this study is the lack of evidence regarding the effects of deliberate media campaigns on the reduction in DD behavior (DeJong & Hingson, 1998; Haskins, 1985; Vingilis & Coultes, 1990) . These campaigns have promoted a wide range of objectives, from increasing public awareness to the problem of DD behavior (DeJong & Atkin, 1995; Murry, Stam, & Lastovicka, 1996) and informing drivers about enhanced enforcement efforts (Holder, 1994; Mercer, 1985) , to promoting and modeling techniques of avoiding DD incidents. These tactics include appointing a designated driver (DeJong & Wallack, 1992; Winsten, 1994) , conducting peer group interventions to prevent intoxicated individuals from driving (DeJong & Atkin, 1995) , and teaching skills to resist peer group pressure to drink and drive (Brown, 1997) . The only notable evidence of media effects on reduction in DD behavior comes from programs that used media messages in conjunction with rigorous enforcement initiatives (Holder, 1994; Mercer, 1985) . Such effects, however, were both short term and limited to specific locations. In addition, some success was claimed for designated driver programs (Winsten, 1994) , but could not be definitively linked to the reduction in the incidence of DD behavior (DeJong & Hingson, 1998) . However, as suggested by our theoretical discussion thus far, it may be that a broader perspective is needed to uncover media effects on DD behavior change. In particular, it is possible that higher levels of media attention to the DD problem have prompted anti-DD policy response that, in turn, has led to the reduction in the incidence of DD behavior between 1978 and 1996.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of media attention to the public problem of DD will be associated with higher levels of policy response to the DD problem.
This hypothesis extends the basic agenda-setting hypothesis. The assumption made here is that increased media attention to the DD problem will be associated with increased salience of the DD problem on the policy agenda, and thus with higher volume of policy actions taken to address the problem.
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of policy response to the DD problem will be associated with lower levels of involvement in DD behavior.
This hypothesis reflects the expectation that individuals will positively respond (i.e., reduce their involvement in DD) to policy actions taken to constrain their involvement in risky behaviors. Underlying this expectation is the assumption that individuals are motivated to change their behavior to avoid being formally sanctioned for involvement in this behavior. This hypothesis is justified also by the substantial body of research (e.g., Berger & Marelich, 1997; DeJong & Hingson, 1998; Hingson, 1993; McPhee, 1992; Neustrom & Norton, 1993; Rogers & Schoenig, 1994; Voas, Holder, & Gruenewald, 1997) demonstrating that anti-DD legislation and enforcement both at the national and the state level have resulted in substantial gains in terms of reduction in DD behavior.
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of media attention to the DD problem will be associated with lower levels of involvement in DD behavior. When controlling for the effect of policy response on involvement in DD behavior, this association will substantially decrease.
Theoretically, it is possible that higher levels of media attention to the DD problem will increase individual perception of risks associated with DD behavior (i.e., the risk of being injured or killed in a DD-related accident, or the risk of being sanctioned for drinking and driving if caught) and will thus motivate drivers to change their behavior. As noted above, however, such direct media effect is less likely to take place. Rather, it is more likely that the direct association between increased media attention and decreased DD behavior disguises the actual relationship between these variables that is mediated by policy response to the DD problem.
Method
Two important considerations guided the choice of appropriate method for testing the research hypotheses. The first is that our hypotheses address the cumulative impact of enduring media attention on related policy and individual behavior (Hertog & Fan, 1995; Watt, Mazza, & Snyder, 1993) . The research hypotheses are therefore tested within a longitudinal research design that is similar to designs used in previous studies that addressed the relationship between trends in media attention and trends in public beliefs and policy making (see Gonzenbach, 1996; Hertog & Fan, 1995; Rogers et al., 1991; Trumbo, 1995; Woodard, 1998) . These studies typically employed a hybrid combination of time-series analysis methods to accommodate differences in the quality of the data used for testing hypotheses similar to the current study's hypotheses. One such method, time-series regression, is used in this study.
The second important methodological consideration concerns the level of analysis. As our research hypotheses address the impact of the mass media and policy response as macrolevel variables on individual-level behavior, they were tested at the aggregated level of analysis. Yet, aggregating individual-level data to represent group behavior may result in two related problems of cross-level inference, a fallacy of composition and ecological fallacy (Price, Ritchie, & Eulau, 1991) . Nonetheless, aggregation is appropriate if both micro-and macrolevel units represent similar constructs (Nass & Reeves, 1991) and if individuals (or groups of individuals) are implicated in the relationship between constructs (Pan & McLeod, 1991) . Because the study's hypotheses meet both requirements (i.e., they address the impact of media content produced by media professionals on policy makers, whose legislative behavior or actions then influence drivers' involvement in DD behavior), aggregation seems appropriate and cross-level inference may be deemed valid. In addition, the aggregation procedure employed in this study is similar to the one previously used by other researchers (Gonzenbach, 1996; Hertog & Fan, 1995; Rogers et al., 1991; Trumbo, 1995) to study relationships between media coverage and public beliefs or behaviors.
National Media Attention
Content analysis was used to generate the total number of DD-related news items for each month from January 1978 to December 1996. The unit of analysis (the sampling unit) was defined as any news item that directly addressed one or more aspects of DD. Because a conservative measure of media attention was sought, only items that addressed directly the issue of DD were included in the analysis. Excluded from the analysis were items that only mentioned DD but were not direct reports on DD incidents or DD associated stories. For example, a news story that compared the success of a citizens' group against child molesters to that of citizen groups against DD (Mathews, 1982) was excluded from the analysis. News items were further defined as newspaper articles so that a single complete DD article constituted a single recording unit. Finally, all newspaper articles on DD that appeared in the course of each month from January 1978 to December 1996 (a total of 225 months) constituted the sampling frame.
Following Krippendorff (1980) , two kinds of considerations informed the choice of the sampling strategy in this study: deciding on the most relevant content for analysis in line with the intended inference from this content, and validating the sampling method (given that a census of newspaper articles on DD was used). Two newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post, were chosen for their agenda setting role within the news media (Dearing & Rogers, 1996) and the strong relationship that exists between these newspapers and other national news sources (as demonstrated below). In addition, there is evidence that both newspapers are central to policy makers (Hess, 1984; Rogers et al., 1991) for whom this study will make later inference.
All news stories about the issue of DD between January 1978 and December 1996 that were included in these newspapers (N = 4,238) were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis online database. Whereas the use of online databases is fairly common for retrieving newspaper items (Roberts, 1997) , problems of sampling may challenge both the internal and external validity of the study. To avoid possible sampling errors, the search phrase that was used for retrieving relevant news stories (in Lexis/Nexis syntax: "drunk! or drink! or intoxicated or impaired w/1 driv!") was tested for its semantic validity by taking measures of recall and precision (Salton & McGill, 1983; Wray, Maxwell, & Hornik, 1998) . Recall addresses the concern that the search phrase used does not adequately capture the entire universe of relevant content items (error of omission). Precision, on the other hand, addresses the concern that the search phrase used captures a substantial number of nonrelevant content items (error of commission).
To estimate errors of recall and precision associated with the search phrase used, we analyzed DD-related news stories that were included in 40 months that were randomly sampled from the 225 months of media coverage included in the research period. To estimate the recall error, we first employed an open search phrase, that is, "drinking AND driving," that was aimed at capturing any possible news story that dealt with drinking and driving. This procedure generated a total of 2,123 news items. Each item was reviewed to determine whether it was relevant to the topic of DD, and 1,058 were found to be relevant. Next, the original search phrase was used to retrieve relevant news items from the same sample. This procedure generated 1,026 news items, of which 1,014 were found to be relevant.
The proportion of news story recall for each month was calculated by dividing the number of relevant news stories retrieved by the original search phrase (N = 1,014) by the number of relevant news stories retrieved by the open search phrase (N = 1,058). On average, the proportion of recall for each month was found to be high (recall = .96, SD = .025). The proportion of news story precision was calculated for each month by dividing the number of relevant news stories retrieved by the original search phrase (N = 1,014) by the total number of relevant and nonrelevant news stories retrieved by the same search phrase (N = 1,026). On average, the proportion of precision for each month was high (precision = .98, SD = .013). Hence, the concern regarding the semantic validity of the original search phrase was removed and it was used for retrieving a census of all DD-related news stories.
To validate the choice of The New York Times and The Washington Post as news sources, the same search phrase and the same online database were used for retrieving a sample of DD news items from the Associated Press (AP) wire service for the same 40 months. The AP news items served as a surrogate measure of the national news environment (see Fan, 1988 for further details). The correlation between the number of DD news items in both newspapers and their number in the AP wire was strong and statistically significant (r = .89, p < .01). This association further supports the claim that The New York Times and The Washington Post provide a good estimate of national media attention to the issue of DD.
The criterion for discriminating between relevant and nonrelevant DD news items was tested for intercoder reliability. Following a common procedure of this test (Krippendorff, 1980) , 10 independent coders were asked to code 30 news items that were randomly selected from the sample of items that were generated earlier by using the open search term (N = 1,058) . The results of their coding were compared with those of the authors to establish the level of agreement by using the Krippendorff's alpha agreement coefficient. The level of intercoder agreement was found to be high (= = .89).
Following previous formulations of cumulative media coverage of issues (Hertog & Fan, 1995; Watt et al., 1993; Zhu & Boroson, 1997; Zhu, Watt, Snyder, Yan, & Jiang, 1993) , we assumed that the impact of each DD-related news story would decline over time in an exponential manner, with a half-life of 1 day. That is, the greatest effect of a single news story occurs on the day it is published. The next day it retains half of its original effect, the third day a fourth, the fourth day an eighth, and so on until it reaches zero. Theoretically, this formulation is justified because it captures the rate of memory decay after exposure to a message in the mass media . In addition, several studies (Fan, 1988; Watt et al., 1993) have found this formulation to be the most efficient in estimating media effects. To be fair, the results of our subsequent analysis using this measure were similar to these obtained by using a simple frequency measure. Notwithstanding, this formulation is more theoretically adequate and thus was used in the current study to create the measure of media attention to the DD problem.
Federal Anti-DD Legislation
The current study treats policy response as an indicator of the general institutional response to the DD problem. Policy response is both easier to quantify and measure and permits a comparison of results across many studies that focused on the media-policy link, including the few that have looked at this relationship over time (Gonzenbach, 1996; Rogers et al., 1991; Trumbo, 1995) .
For the purposes of this study, policy response was operationalized as the number of DD-related bills introduced in the U.S. Congress between 1978 and 1996. Data on federal anti-DD legislation for the years 1978 to 1996 were obtained from the Library of Congress legislative records. These records provide information on the date, number, and content of bills introduced each year to the U.S. Congress. All types of DD-related bills constituted this measure, including bills intended to increase the legal drinking age to 21, allocate resources to different agencies and states for the purpose of fighting DD, and increase public awareness of the DD problem.
The study used introduced bills rather than bills that were passed in Congress as a measure of legislators' behavior, because the latter measure is heavily dependent on external constraints (e.g., time, cost, and legislative procedures). Because legislators are motivated to act on behalf of an immediate perceived political threat or opportunity, introducing a bill is a better measure of their behavior because (a) it is closer in time to the actual stimulus (e.g., media coverage of a tragic DD accident), and (b) their decision to introduce a bill is less constrained by political obligations, administrative processes, or economical cost compared to passing a bill in Congress. In addition, DD-related Congressional laws are primarily aimed at generating anti-DD legislation at the state level, and thus may be deemed valid regarding effects on individuals across the United States.
Involvement in DD Behavior
DD outcomes typically serve researchers as a measure of involvement in DD behavior. These outcomes include alcohol-related traffic fatalities that are supplemented with other surrogate measures, including nighttime accidents, single-vehicle accidents, weekend nighttime accidents, single-vehicle nighttime accidents, and male driver single-vehicle nighttime accidents (Heeren, Smith, Morelock, & Hingson, 1985) . Outcomes of a behavior, however, are not necessarily indicative of the behavior itself. Changes in outcomes do not necessarily imply that prior behavior change occurred; other factors (such as better safety measures in cars) may be responsible for the change in outcomes. For that reason, the more direct measure of DD behavior, drivers' blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels, was used in this study.
Data on drivers' BAC levels is available only for drivers who were involved in a fatal traffic accident, and is collected by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) based on BAC test results. Because BAC test results are not universally available for drivers who were involved in a fatal traffic accident, NHTSA developed a statistical method for estimating the BAC levels of all drivers involved in fatal accidents based on the characteristics of drivers included in the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). FARS is a census of all fatal traffic accidents in the United States and is available from January 1975 onward.
One potential problem with using this measure in our analysis is that BAC levels of drivers involved in a fatal traffic accident probably underestimate the actual prevalence of DD behavior. Yet, trends in BAC levels among drivers involved in a fatal traffic accident may still be representative of trends in BAC levels among the general population of drivers if it is assumed that any difference in trends of BAC levels between drivers involved in a fatal accident and drivers who are not constitutes a systematic bias. To be safe, we correlated this measure with trends in self-reported involvement in DD behavior from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) that is administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Measures of self-reported DD were taken from a representative sample of U.S. adults in each month from 1984 onward. After limiting our analysis to drivers in this sample, the trend in BAC levels between 1984 and 1996 was strongly and significantly correlated to the trend in self-reported DD (r = .94, p < .01, N = 156 months), suggesting that the BAC level is a valid measure.
The legal definition of DD in most states at present time is driving a vehicle with a BAC level of .08 and above (that is, .08 g of alcohol per 1 dl of blood). Throughout most of the research period, however, the legal level of intoxication was .10. Given that, the proportion of drivers with a BAC level of .10 and above who were involved in a fatal crash in each month from 1978 to 1996 was used as a measure of involvement in DD behavior. As some may contest this decision on grounds that a BAC level as low as .05 is high enough to negatively impair everyone's driving ability (DeJong & Hingson, 1998) , we compared the trend in this measure (i.e., the standardized linear regression coefficient of time on BAC level) to those of two alternative measures (i.e., mean BAC level, and BAC level of .01 to .09) using the Rosenthal's heterogeneity test suggested by Zhu and Boroson (1997) , and found no statistically significant difference (? 2 = 1.12, df = 2, p = .50).
Analysis
To avoid possible biases in the measure of institutional response over time due to extended Congressional recesses or adjournments, and to allow sufficient variance in this variable across time points, all measures were aggregated to 6-month periods. 3 Overall, the analysis was performed on 38 consecutive 6-month periods. Although 38 time-ordered observations are sufficient to warrant a stable measurement of variables over time, this number is insufficient for employing time-series models such as the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA; McCleary & Hay, 1980) . Thus, the principle strategy of data analysis employed in this study was time-series regression analysis (Ostrom, 1990) , which is a variation of the basic regression model that uses time-series data. In principle, this procedure involves making the hypothesized independent series stationary by first-order differencing (i.e., replacing the original data values by the difference between adjacent time-ordered values) and then conducting a cross-correlation analysis to examine the relationship between two time-series. The cross-correlation function can be simply understood as the between-series correlation, or the correlation between one series at time t 0 and another series at each of its lags. A statistically significant correlation at a certain lag indicates the time lag required for the independent series to affect the dependent series. If no significant correlation is found in any of the lags, however, our conclusion would be that the two time-series are independent of one another or affected by the same external force. When the independent series is not white noise (i.e., it varies randomly over time), the cross-correlation function will reflect both between-series dependencies and within-series dependencies. On the other hand, when the independent series is white noise, the between-series dependencies are accounted for if an assumption is made that the same external forces are responsible to the nonstationary component of both the dependent and the independent series. In other words, it is assumed that the independent series can account for the nonstationary component in the dependent series. This containment approach (McCleary & Hay, 1980) reduces the number of degrees of freedom lost in subsequent analyses (such as regression) and is thus beneficial when only a limited number of time-ordered observations is available. Alternatively, both series may be first-order differenced prior to conducting the cross-correlation analysis to determine the time lag of effect from the independent to the dependent series. Next, a regression analysis is conducted where the independent variable is lagged according to the results of the cross-correlation analysis.
This procedure was followed as prescribed with one modification. As noted by Watt (1994) , whereas first-order differencing may produce a stationary series, it also destroys all information about the absolute value and the trend in the original data that are theoretically important for explaining the variance in the series over time. Instead, variables can be made stationary by fitting a least square regression line to the data and creating a transformed time-series based on the regression residuals. This technique was used to make the independent series stationary prior to conducting the crosscorrelation analysis.
Results
Figure 1 presents trends in national media attention to the issue of DD, federal anti-DD legislation, and involvement in DD behavior between 1978 and 1996.
From 1978 to 1996, a total of 125 anti-DD bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress. The amount of legislation does not show a monotonic trend, although the most notable increase in anti-DD legislation occurred between 1982 and 1991. Peaks in legislation are also evident for the years 1993 and 1995. Similar to the trend in anti-DD legislation, the amount of DD news items increased rapidly (by almost 80%) over a period of 7 years (from 1978 to 1984) . Following a period of relative stability between 1984 and 1987, the number of DD news items picked up once again during 1988, dropped down through 1992, and slightly increased from 1993 through 1995. At the same time, a steady and moderate decreasing trend (of about 27%) in drivers' involvement in DD behavior took place between 1978 and 1995.
To test the first hypothesis that higher levels of media attention to the DD problem will be associated with higher levels of DD-related federal legislation, we first employed a cross-correlation analysis between these variables after transforming the independent series (i.e., media attention) as described above. The results of this analysis indicated a significant positive effect of media on legislation at Lag 1 (i.e., cumulated media attention in the preceding 6 months affected the current level of legislation). that our choice of time units is not sufficiently sensitive in detecting the time lag of the media's effect, we repeated the analysis for quarters. Consistent with the results of the previous analysis, we found a significant effect of media attention on anti-DD legislation at Lag 2 (i.e., two quarters or 6 months). Based on this finding, we used a time-series regression in which the dependent series was DD-related legislation and the independent series was media attention lagged by 6 months to estimate this effect. As expected, the effect of DD-related media attention on DD-related legislation was positive, strong, and statistically significant (B = .68, SE = .005, N = 37). Overall, cumulative media attention in the preceding 6 months accounted for about 46% of the increase in DD-related federal legislation over time. Other sources of influence on legislators, such as pressure from grassroots activism groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (McPhee, 1992; Reinarman, 1988) , may account for the remaining variance. Table 1 presents the results of three time-series models used for testing Hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 1 addresses Hypothesis 2, whereas Models 2 and 3 provide a test of Hypothesis 3. For each model, a host of tests was conducted 443 Yanovitzky, Bennett • Media Attention Driving and Drunk Driving-Related Federal Legislation, United States, 1978-1996 to ensure that ordinary least square (OLS) regression assumptions are not violated (Woodard, 1998) . First, the Durbin-Watson test of correlated errors was conducted. When there are no serial correlations, the expected DurbinWatson value is approximately 2, where positive serial correlation will result in a value lesser than 2 and negative serial correlation will result in a value greater than 2. Next, the Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test (Engle, 1982) was used to evaluate the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. This statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom, whereas a nonsignificant result indicates that the errors are homoscedastic. Finally, to assess multicollinearity (the degree to which predictor variables are related to one another), the tolerance of each predictor was assessed. Tolerance is the amount of variation that a predictor does not explain in the other predictors and ranges from 0 (perfect collinearity) to 1 (no collinearity). Overall, as evident in Table 1 , no violation of the regression assumptions was detected in any of the models. Hypothesis 2 argues for negative association over time between DDrelated federal legislation and involvement in DD behavior. Following the detrending (or the removal of trends) of the legislation series, a crosscorrelation analysis between these two series revealed a significant negative effect of DD-related legislation on involvement in DD behavior at Lag 1. That is, the amount of legislation in the preceding 6 months affected the current level of involvement in DD behavior. Model 1 in Table 1 demonstrates that, as hypothesized, this effect was negative, substantial, and statistically significant. Overall, DD-related legislation in the preceding 6 months accounted for 51% of the reduction over time in DD behavior.
Hypothesis 3 was tested in two steps. First, the main effect of DD-related media attention on involvement in DD behavior was estimated. In the next step, DD-related federal legislation was added to this regression model to estimate the direct effects of media attention on behavior while controlling for the effects of legislation. It was hypothesized that when controlling for the effect of legislation on DD behavior, the direct effect of media attention on DD behavior would no longer be significant.
The cross-correlation analysis between the detrended media attention series and the DD behavior series revealed significant negative effects of media on behavior at Lags 1 and 2 (i.e., cumulative media attention both in the preceding 6 months and the preceding year affects the current level of involvement in DD behavior). The subsequent regression analysis (Model 2 in Table 1 ) indicated that in practice only the effect of DD-related media attention at Lag 1 was statistically significant. This effect accounted for 48% of the reduction in DD behavior over time. However, as evident in Model 3, when controlling for the effects of DD-related federal legislation on DD behavior, the effect of media attention on behavior was no longer significant whereas the effect of DD-related legislation continued to be significant, providing support to the hypothesized association between these three variables. The explained variance in DD behavior over time by both media attention and federal legislation (R 2 = .50) is similar to the explained variance by legislation alone.
Conclusion
Our analysis provides some compelling evidence of indirect media effects on DD behavior. Increased media attention to the DD problem accounted for about 50% of the variance in DD-related policy response over time that, in turn, accounted for 50% of the variance in DD behavior over time. When controlling for the impact of DD-related policy response on DD behavior, the observed effect of DD-related media attention on DD behavior was no longer significant. The lack of evidence of direct media effects on DD behavior in this study is consistent with findings of previous studies (DeJong & Hingson, 1998; Haskins, 1985; Vingilis & Coultes, 1990) , with the exception that exposure to general news coverage and not to deliberate public health campaigns was considered in the current study. At the same time, the evidence of indirect (or mediated) media effects on DD behavior stand in striking contrast to the general failure of previous studies to provide evidence of media effects on this behavior. If, as we argued above, DD behavior is representative of other lifestyle behaviors such as smoking and consumption of high-fat foods, it may be that the lack of conclusive evidence of media effects on changes in these behaviors reflects researchers' failure to consider indirect media effects on these behaviors. Before discussing the possible implications of the current study, some words of caution regarding our interpretation of the results are necessary. First, the study's results may be constrained by the quality of data used in this study. In particular, using BAC estimates as a measure of DD behavior may have introduced some biases into the analysis (i.e., underestimation of DD behavior incidence). If anything, though, these potential biases may have led us to underestimate the actual effects of media attention and legislative action on DD behavior. A second concern may arise regarding our ability to draw inferences about individual behavior change from an aggregated measure of this behavior. As the use of aggregated-level data seems to be appropriate in this study, we believe that valid inference on individual behavior change can be made in this case.
Nonetheless, the current study is not free of limitations. For example, differential effects across demographic groups (i.e., age, gender, race, region, etc.) were not examined in this study, although the literature on DD behavior point to the importance of these factors regarding this behavior (DeJong & Hingson, 1998) . Also not fully explored were the effects of media frames and other possible influential characteristics of media content (Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991) on the behavior of both drivers and policy makers. Hence, our discussion of media effects is limited to the effects of changes in the amount of media attention. Similarly, it remains unclear how institutional response influences behavior. It is possible, for example, that legislation influences behavior through changes in surrounding social norms and not through personal deterrence. Our study is unable to distinguish these two possible effects, as the available data do not permit us to conduct such an analysis. Finally, clearly not all relevant variables that may have contributed to the reduction in DD behavior were included in the analysis. In particular, the role of change in surrounding social norms within social networks in promoting individual behavior change merits further exploration.
New Directions in the Search for Media Effects
For several decades, researchers' theoretical and empirical efforts to uncover substantial media effects on human behavior have predominantly focused on the effects of direct individual exposure to media content. In general, this line of research provided evidence of minimal media effects, at best (Klapper, 1960; McGuire, 1986) . Notwithstanding, communication scholars have made several attempts to salvage the myth of substantial media effects since Klapper's (1960) pessimistic notion of minimal media effects. Many of these attempts were inspired by McGuire's (1986) seminal suggestion to consider the unintended effects of media content on human cognition and behavior. Subsequent research on media effects such as priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) , framing (Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991) , agenda setting (McCombs et al., 1995) , and cultivation (Gerbner et al., 1986) has provided compelling evidence of media effects on human cognition and judgements. Moreover, there is some evidence that all individuals are equally susceptible to such media effects, regardless of their level of exposure to media content (Zhu & Boroson, 1997) .
The results of this study suggest that future research efforts to uncover media effects on human behavior may also benefit from considering the impact of mass media on the social and cultural environment that surrounds people and influences their behavior. From this perspective, the mass media may be more effective in influencing behavior through their impact on social institutions. Hence, public communication campaigns aimed at regulating people's behavior may be more successful in meeting their goals if they focus on promoting actions by social institutions rather than targeting at-risk individuals with persuasive messages.
The present study also begins to specify the theoretical and methodological foundations of studying indirect media effects. Theoretically, it may be useful to consider media effects at the higher-than-individual level (i.e., societal level or group level). It is also important to address the question of cumulative effect of exposure to enduring media content. In so doing, it is also important to recognize that human behavior change is likely to be slow and gradual rather than rapid and substantial. The methodological implications of these theoretical guidelines is that uncovering substantial media effects on behavior requires the incorporation of the time dimension into the analysis and a multilevel analysis of the relationship between mass media content and human behavior. In any event, it is clear that much theoretical and methodological work is needed to allow systematic investigation of indirect media effects on behavior. Notes 1. A previous version of this article was presented at the 48th International Communication Association annual conference, Jerusalem, July 1998. The authors wish to thank Robert C. Hornik (the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania) and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful remarks on an earlier version of this article.
2. This possible route of media effects on behavior somewhat resembles the twostep flow of communication hypothesis (Katz, 1957) , but it addresses the flow of influence from the mass media to other social institutions and from them to individual behavior.
3. Traditional periods of extended Congressional recess or adjournment are the month of August, mid-October to mid-January, and 2 weeks in March.
